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Abstract 
This technical report details the results of risk sharing in the EU country by country. The 
great recession and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in Europe have shown an 
asymmetric behavior of the different member countries of the EU, also with regards of risk 
sharing. We provide country specific measures decomposing risk sharing as that obtained 
via the capital markets, international transfers and savings or the credit markets channel. 
Afterwords, we use a mean group estimator to measure average risk sharing for the group 
of countries. This can help to identify where risk sharing is working and through which 
channels. 
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1 Executive summary1 
 
The Five Presidents’ Reports (2015), and more recently the Investment Plan for Europe 
(2016) claim the need for mechanisms and institutions capable of absorbing the impact of 
economic shocks across states and regions and achieve an effective risk-sharing across 
European countries. One of these mechanisms is the Capital Markets Union aimed at 
promoting cross-border links and cross-ownership of productive assets. The possibility to 
receive interests or dividends from investments made abroad or to earn profits from 
activities undertaken in other countries allows, in hard times, to reduce the volatility in 
disposable income that would otherwise occur, hereby, sustaining domestic consumption 
and investments. International risk sharing therefore focuses on the cross border channels 
at work in smoothing income and consumption when a country is hit by an output shock.  
We follow the international literature and use the term risk-sharing to identify the 3 
channels through which shocks to GDP are cushioned: 1) the capital markets channel, 
capturing private cross-border links; (2) the government channel, capturing international 
public transfers; and (3) the credit markets channel also affected by domestic (fiscal) 
policies. A disclaimer is needed: 2 of these channels (the capital market and the 
government channel) imply only cross border links and, therefore, the possibility to share 
domestic risks with other countries. The third channel (credit market) captures all the 
policies affecting gross savings (e.g. domestic fiscal policies, and international capital 
transfers) mixing pure domestic smoothing with cross-border effects taking place through 
net borrowing and lending from the rest of the world. This decomposition comes from the 
system of National Accounts and is limited by its structure.  
In an ideal world of perfect risk sharing, countries are completely insured against bad 
events, and domestic consumption growth is independent from domestic output growth. 
In practice, this is hardly the case. If in the US three quarters of shocks to per capita GDP 
of individual states are absorbed (smoothed), Europe is lagging far behind and in spite of 
the recent recuperation that can be measured including data up to 2016, still more than 
60% of GDP idiosyncratic shocks remain unsmoothed, i.e. directly transmitted to domestic 
consumption. This very high average figure yet can hide highly heterogeneous patterns 
across countries. In this report we provide country measures of risk sharing for all the 
EU countries. Our measures are based on estimations using a variety of models, from those 
customarily used in the literature to the more recent dynamic approach to take into 
account, among other things, the interdependence of the channels. 
 
                                           
1  The content of this report does not reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Responsibility for the 
information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the authors. 
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Our findings are the following: 
• In line with the literature, the bulk of risk sharing takes place through the credit 
markets (saving) channel in all EU28 countries. The credit markets channel 
smooths more than 50% of the shocks in some countries, being an important 
buffer for output shocks especially in Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Greece and 
Belgium (sample 1960-2016). A subsample analysis (1999-2016) reveals that 
this channel has had a reduced incidence in several countries (e.g. Sweden and 
Belgium) after the introduction of the euro.  
• For several countries (among them Italy and Portugal), we find that the credit 
market channel acted as shock amplifier during the recent 2008 crisis and 
subsequent sovereign debt crisis, provoking a certain degree of dis-smoothing 
(the shock not only is transmitted to consumption but that channel induces 
additional consumption drop). . 
• Risk sharing has greater effects in small open economies: Sweden is able to 
smooth about 3 times more than Germany and UK in the first subsample. 
• Risk sharing through international public transfers is almost non-existent 
for all periods and countries analysed. 
• Capital markets risk sharing remains very low for all subsets of countries and 
periods considered. Nevertheless, it increased its role in recent times, especially 
in the Baltic countries and Ireland. 
• Luxembourg and Malta also emerge as achieving high quotas of risk sharing, 
especially through the capital and credit markets channels. This reflects their 
roles of financial hubs.  
 
Our findings suggest a number of general issues relevant for policy making: 
 
1. Both, the interactions of the channels as well as their dynamic behavior should be 
taken into account for policy recommendations. As for the first, the analysis we 
provide relies on estimates of risk sharing on impact, that is, contemporaneous to the 
shock. This is when most of risk sharing takes place. However, analysing the dynamic 
aspects of risk sharing, the picture may change: after an initial positive smoothing 
following a GDP shock, we find, for some countries, a dis-smoothing in the credit 
channel in the subsequent years. 
 
2. The interaction between channels needs to be considered when designing policies 
targeted to a single channel. Our analysis shows that when there is an interaction 
between channels they act mainly as substitutes: policies positively affecting the 
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capital channel may produce negative (dis-smoothing) effects in the credit channel. 
Whether the substitution effects also hold for the government channel needs to be 
analysed. 
3. From the country-specific analysis emerges that in Europe risk sharing is mainly 
confined to small and open economies as in larger countries the scale of cross-
border risk sharing is relatively small as compared with the size of the economy.  
4. The highest positive figures for the capital markets channel are obtained in Ireland and 
the Baltic countries. In spite of having the same label, risk-sharing, the situation is 
totally different in these two examples. In the Baltic countries, the banking union was 
the mechanism at work to smooth the shocks: by transferring funds to their subsidiaries 
in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, foreign owned banks (mainly Finnish and Swedish) 
acted as shock absorbers allowing the Baltic citizens to smooth their consumption 
during the negative GDP shocks of the latest crisis. On the contrary, in Ireland, we find 
smoothing of positive GDP shocks: foreign owned companies that moved their 
headquarters to Ireland for tax purposes, contributed to high positive GDP growth. A 
substantial part of this growth, however, was redirected back in the form of outflows 
of equity income provoking the smoothing of positive GDP growth.  Risk sharing is 
therefore a stabilizer that works both ways: for negative as well as for positive 
shocks.  
5. The size of the shocks experienced by each country is very different and deserves 
careful evaluation. The volatility of idiosyncratic GDP for Ireland and Greece is 10 and 
8 times, respectively, that of more stable countries, like France, Belgium or the 
Netherlands. This implies that not all the countries had the same needs in terms 
of risk sharing. We find that, for European countries, the size of the shock is not 
related to the size of the economy while the degree of risk-sharing is. Our findings point 
to an effective role of risk sharing in small countries only: being small and open though 
necessary is not a sufficient condition to profit from risk sharing.  
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2 Introduction 
 
International risk sharing focuses on the cross-border channels at work for smoothing 
income and consumption when a country is hit by an output shock. In hard (good) times, 
the possibility to receive or distribute interests or dividends from investments made abroad 
or to earn profits form activities undertaken in other countries allows reducing the 
fluctuations in disposable income that would otherwise occur, hereby, stabilizing domestic 
consumption and investments and, finally, supporting growth. 
Clearly, the capability of a system of countries to share risks not only depends on the 
cross-border mechanisms which attenuate fluctuations of disposable income but also on 
the domestic pattern of savings influenced, among other things, by country specific fiscal 
policies. The literature proposes three channels for sharing risks in case of idiosyncratic 
GDP shocks: the capital markets channel, the government or fiscal channel (also known as 
public risk sharing) and the credit markets channel. Whereas the first two channels are 
only dealing with cross-border transactions, the third mixes cross-border transactions with 
domestic smoothing (see next section) and can be seen as the part of consumption 
smoothing achieved through public and private dis-saving. We are fully aware of the 
ambiguity of these definitions rooted in the categorization of national accounts items, but 
we stick to this labelling following a well-established literature and denote the channels as 
capital markets, government and credit markets channels. 
In an ideal world of perfect risk sharing, where countries are completely insured against 
output shocks, domestic consumption growth will be orthogonal (hence, independent) to 
idiosyncratic or country specific output growth. In practice, this is rarely the case. Even in 
well-functioning monetary unions like the US, evidence suggests that one quarter of shocks 
to per capita GDP of individual states remains unsmoothed (Asdrubali et al., 1996). We 
find that in the Euro Area and the European Union more than 60% of GDP idiosyncratic 
shocks remain unsmoothed. This very high average figure, however, can hide highly 
heterogeneous patterns across countries that deserve further investigation. Anecdotic 
evidence, in fact, suggests that the 2008 recession and the subsequent sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe led to an asymmetric risk sharing of the different EU member states. 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2014), for instance, link the recent downfall in risk sharing of 
peripheral European Union (EU) countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) to 
the fact that their governments did not save during the expansionary phases of the 
business cycle and were not able to borrow on the international markets during the crisis 
due to the high levels of outstanding public debt. 
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The idea of country specific risk sharing was first introduced by Mélitz and Zumer (1999) 
and further developed in Sørensen, Wu, Yosha and Zhu (2007). However, as Asdrubali, 
Kim, Pericoli and Poncela (2017) point out, these authors focus on interaction effects with 
country specific explanatory variables and not on country specific estimates per-se of risk 
sharing. Our aim, therefore, is to fill this gap providing an individual characterization of 
risk sharing for each of the channels and each country of the EU and several subsets within 
it. As in Asdrubali et al. (2017), we measure country specific risk sharing, but we focus on 
the countries in the EU, instead of the set of OECD countries. We also capture the change 
in risk sharing due to more recent turbulent times, providing a subsample analysis, 
whenever data availability allows. We estimate a variety of models, generalizing the results 
shown in the policy report “Risk sharing in Europe” by Poncela, Pericoli, Manca and Nardo 
(2016). The interested reader should refer to it for the general setup to measure static and 
dynamic risk sharing, the notation, the exact definitions, the estimation methods and the 
pros and cons of each estimation strategy. However, instead of considering the countries 
as homogeneous, we allow for country heterogeneity as in Asdrubali et al. (2017), where 
the reader is referred for the general set up of country heterogeneity in risk sharing. 
9 
3 The channels of risk-sharing 
 
Following the structure of national accounts, Asdrubali et al. (1996) defined three 
channels for risk sharing (or, equivalently, consumption smoothing): the capital markets 
channel, the government channel and the credit markets channel. They start from the 
following identity:2  
 
ܩܦܲ = ܩܦܲܩܰܫ
ܩܰܫ
ܩܦܫ
ܩܦܫ
ܥ ܥ 
 
where GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product, GNI for Gross National Income, GDI for 
Gross Disposable Income and C for Consumption. Manipulating the identity (for details, 
see Poncela et al. 2016) one obtains workable expressions for the three channels: 
 
Δlog(GDP) − 	Δlog(GNI) = ߚ଴,௄ + ߚ௄Δlog(GDP) + ݑ௄   (1) 
Δlog(GNI) − 	Δlog(GDI) = ߚ଴,ி + ߚிΔlog(GDP) + ݑி   (2) 
Δlog(GDI) − 	Δlog(C) = ߚ଴,஼ + ߚ஼Δlog(GDP) + ݑ஼    (3) 
Δlog(C) = ߚ଴,௎ + ߚ௎Δlog(GDP) + ݑ௎     (4) 
 
Equation (1) is employed to identify the capital markets channel and is based on the 
difference between Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Income. It corresponds to 
national accounts’ Net Factor Income (NFI) category and accounts for two types of 
transactions between residents and non-residents:  
 
• Income from work: compensations to national employees working abroad. 
Migrants are excluded if living in the foreign country for more than one year. 
 
• Income from property or investments: rents, interests and profits, including 
retained earnings. It includes factor income from abroad gained from properties 
(e.g. buildings, shops, factories, financial assets like bonds and shares in foreign 
countries) and earning, thereby, rents and interests. The item also includes 
                                           
2 From the System of National Accounts the following identities hold: GNI = GDP + primary incomes receivable 
from the rest of the world - primary incomes payable to the rest of the world. GDI=GNI + current transfers 
receivable from the rest of the world - current transfers payable to the rest of the world. S=GDI - final 
consumption expenditure. 
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profits earned from  entrepreneurial activities of goods and services production. 
It covers income from foreign direct investments, portfolio investment incomes 
and other investment incomes, and includes payments on debt securities 
(interests) and on equity securities (dividends). Notice that capital gains and 
losses coming from buying or selling activities/securities do not pertain to this 
channel since they are classified as part of the value of the investments (and 
included in the credit channel). 
 
To get a flavour of the importance of each type of transaction on cross border smoothing 
through the capital markets channel, The Quarterly Report on the Euro Area (2016) 
estimated for a group of 13 countries3 belonging to the euro area, that only 0.2% of shocks 
were smoothed through cross-border labour compensation, out of the 5.6% of total shocks 
smoothed through this channel, indicating that most of the risk sharing achieved through 
this channel was due to income from property or investments. 
Equation (2) is used to identify the fiscal or government channel (or public risk-
sharing) and is based on the difference between Gross Disposable Income and Gross 
National Income, i.e. Net International Transfers (NIT). It includes transfers made by a 
resident entity to a non-resident entity without an economic counterpart. It includes 
general government transfers (transfers between governments and international 
cooperation entities) such as cash transfers between governments in order to finance 
current expenditures; gifts of food, international aid for earthquakes or natural disasters; 
gifts on military equipment and regular contributions paid by governments to international 
organizations and vice versa. Included here are also transfers between governments 
and non-residents other than governments and international organizations. For instance, 
current taxes on income or social security contributions between a government and non-
residents are included here. Certain classes of cross-border transfers made between 
private sectors are also recorded in this category and include workers’ remittances by 
migrants (staying in the foreign country for more than one year) and international transfers 
between private entities aimed to alleviate poverty and the consequences of natural 
disasters. 
Equation (3) represents the credit markets channel and is based on the difference 
between Gross Disposable Income and Consumption. This difference is the balancing item 
in the system of national accounts that corresponds to gross savings. It comprises not only 
household savings, but also corporate and government savings. This category includes net 
lending/borrowing to/from the rest of the world plus gross capital formation and net capital 
transfers to the rest of the world. Capital transfers are defined as transfer of the ownership 
                                           
3 The list of countries included in the sample was DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LV, NL, PT, SK and SL. 
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of an asset (other than inventories and cash), or the cancellation of a liability by a creditor, 
without any counterpart being received in return. They cover capital taxes, investment 
grants and other capital transfers. Notice that this channel has also a domestic connotation, 
through the gross capital formation, since agents can smooth consumption by borrowing 
and lending in international markets but also, for instance, by investing less. This channel 
therefore covers both national and international smoothing effects.  
Finally, equation (4), relating consumption to GDP, measures the fraction of domestic 
shocks that is directly transmitted to domestic consumption, hence, remains unsmoothed 
and, therefore 1-ߚ௎ measures the total amount of smoothed shocks. If ߚ௎ = 0, there will be 
full risk sharing, whereas if ߚ௎ > 0, domestic output shocks are at least partially passed to 
consumption. In the extreme case of ߚ௎ > 1, GDP shocks are amplified rather than 
smoothed. 
Each of the estimated parameters ߚ௄, ߚி, 	ߚ஼ in the equations (1) to (3) represents the 
amount of risk sharing (in percentage to 1) that takes place through the capital, 
government and credit channels, respectively. Alternatively, 1-ߚ௎, the total amount of risk 
sharing can also be given by the sum of percentage smoothed through each one of the 
channels, that is, ߚ௄ + ߚி + ߚ஼. Notice that we could have negative estimated betas, 
meaning that the associated channel does not contribute to consumption smoothing but 
rather amplifies consumption volatility in response to GDP shocks. 
 
3.1 The estimated model 
 
We have estimated equations (1) to (3) for the whole data set as well as country by 
country. The estimation with the whole data set will give an idea of the average risk sharing 
for the set of countries for homogeneous countries. The estimation, country by country, 
allows capturing the heterogeneity across the different economies and will give a 
characterization of the structure of risk sharing across the set of countries considered. We 
have used a variety of models, from the most popular ones used in the literature up to 
most sophisticated versions that take into account the dynamic nature of the problem as 
well as the possible issue of bidirectionality (both, Y causes X and X causes Y) in equations 
(1) to (3).4  
We have estimated equations (1) to (3) by Least Squares (LS) methods both from a static 
and a dynamic perspective. We have done this as a robustness check since the static 
approach is the usual in the literature. We have run our estimations for the full sample of 
countries with the largest available time span. However, for long samples and/or sets of 
                                           
4 Bidirectional causation can result in biased estimates. 
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heterogeneous countries, the hypothesis of constant parameters could be difficult to 
maintain, so we have also estimated country specific parameters. We have considered each 
equation in isolation as well as the estimation of equations (1) to (3) as a system (SURE) 
using panel techniques with time fixed effects and errors following an autoregression of 
order 1 to capture the main dynamics in the data. Alternatively, we have estimated a fully-
fledged dynamic model which is a variation of the basic set up described in Poncela et al. 
(2016). It is based on a dynamic panel approach where, instead of pooling all the 
information relative to the countries, we estimate the following system of equations for 
each country: 
௜ܺ,௧ = ܣ଴,௜ + ܣଵ,୧ ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ + ܣଶ,୧ ௜ܺ,௧ିଶ + ⋯+ ܣ௣,௜ ௜ܺ,௧ି௣ + ௜ܷ,௧ (5) 
For each country i and each time period t, ௜ܺ,௧ is the 4 × 1 vector  
௜ܺ,௧ =










−
−
−
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
CGDI
GDIGNI
GNIGDP
GDP
, 
ܣ଴,௜ is the 4x1 vector of intercepts, ܣ௝,௜, j=1,…,p; i=1,…,N are 4 × 4 matrices of coefficients, 
and ௜ܷ,௧ is multivariate white noise. In this setting and according to the literature (i.e., 
Asdrubali and Kim, 2004) the shock is originated via the error term ௜ܷ,௧ and transmitted to 
the whole system. 
Notice that equation (5) is analogous, in compact notation, to the system of equations (1) 
to (3) plus an equation describing GDP dynamics and the addition of a certain number of 
past values of the dependent variable ௜ܺ,௧. Past values are inserted to capture the long-
lasting effects of each channel, i.e. effects that could take place some periods after the 
shock actually hits the country. In so doing we are able to see when a given channel 
acts/stops smoothing consumption, if a channel is activated immediately after the shock 
or if it affects the economy only with some delay. Within this methodology we compute the 
effect of the GDP shock to the system.  
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3.2 The data 
 
The annual data used for the country-specific analysis are coming from National Accounts 
statistics (AMECO5) covering the timespan 1960-2016. Data on GDP, net factor income 
(NFI=GDP-GNI), net international transfers (NIT=GNI-GDI) and savings (S=GDI-C) are 
transformed in growth rates. 
Idiosyncratic GDP reflects that the behaviour of each country’s domestic output can be 
different from the average6 of a group of countries, the target group. We compute 
idiosyncratic values for all the variables in the analysis. We analyse two groups of target 
countries: 
1. European Union 157 (EU15). This choice is only due to data availability, larger 
for this set of countries. As robustness check we repeat the estimation 
eliminating Luxembourg due to its very volatile behavior. We estimate the model 
for the whole time span as well as for the two sub-samples 1960-1998 and 1999-
2016, to highlight the effects of the recent sub-prime and sovereign crises. 
2. European Union countries (EU28). As a robustness check, we also repeat the 
estimations excluding from the analysis Croatia that entered the EU in 2013, 
Luxembourg, which exhibits a very volatile behavior and the smallest EU 
countries (Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus). Lack of data prevents the estimation of 
sub-samples and we limit our sample size to the period 1995-2016. 
To interpret the results, we set to 100 the contemporaneous effect of a shock on GDP, and 
report the fraction smoothed through each channel. Notice that this normalization is done 
for each country. Then, the numbers that appear in the tables should be taken as the 
percentage of idiosyncratic shocks that each country is able to smooth through the different 
channels. 
 
                                           
5 The annual macro-economic database is compiled by DG ECFIN (https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/indicators-statistics/economic-databases/macro-economic-database-ameco_en).  
6 The average is weighted to reflect the importance of each county in the target group (see, Beyer, Doornik, and 
Hendry, 2001, for the exact method of calculating the aggregates). 
7 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
and United Kingdom. 
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4 Results  
 
4.1 Target group: EU15 
 
Table 1 displays the average risk sharing achieved by each country in the period 1960-
2016. We present the results from 2 estimation methods for risk sharing, considering the 
channels jointly in a regression framework (SURE estimation) and adding the dynamic 
behavior to the joint estimation of risk sharing through the 3 channels (VAR estimation). 
SURE estimation, common in the literature, constitutes the benchmark when comparing 
the fully dynamic VAR approach. In the ideal case of full risk sharing among the countries 
in the sample, the shock to idiosyncratic GDP should not be transmitted to domestic 
consumption thanks to cross-border smoothing. The column Total represents the 
percentage of GDP shocks that is overall smoothed or, in other terms, not transmitted to 
domestic consumption (e.g. for Ireland is 63%, with the SURE estimation), while the 
remaining columns detail the percentage of total risk sharing smoothed through each of 
the channels (e.g. in Ireland 14% of the shocks are smoothed via the capital markets 
channel, SURE estimation). Negative percentages indicate “dis-smoothing”: the shock not 
only is transmitted to consumption but that channel induces further reductions. From now 
on, all the tables are read in the same way. As an additional robustness check, we also 
include in the Annex the estimation of risk sharing through each channel when considering 
them in isolation. The results are very close to those of the static system (SURE 
estimation). Table A5 in the Annex shows the benchmark estimation for this group of 
countries and the following tables those for the remaining groups analysed. 
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Table 1. Percentage of risk sharing in case of shocks to domestic output. Analysis per 
country, target group EU15 excluding LU. Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing 
(% of domestic consumption smoothed). Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing 
obtained via capital markets, government and credit channels, respectively. Sample: 1960-
2016. 
 1960-2016 SURE estimation VAR estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit Total Capital Gov Credit 
Austria 25 -1 2 24** 3 -3 1 4 
Belgium 68 7 -4 65*** 46 0 -3 49*** 
Denmark 14 -5 2 17** 13 -2 1 14 
Finland 52 -6*** 0 58*** 43 -1 0 45*** 
France 24 3 -1 22 9 1 2 6 
Germany 25 0 1 25*** 23 -1 2 22** 
Greece 32 3 1 27*** 42 0 -2 44*** 
Ireland 63 14*** 0 49*** 79 17 3 59*** 
Italy 31 4 -2 28*** 26 5 -1 21** 
Netherlands 54 10 -1 46*** 31 0 1 31 
Portugal 13 -4 4 12 15 -3 -1 19 
Spain 23 2 1 21*** 27 3 3 21** 
Sweden 47 -6 0 53*** 63 -8 0 72*** 
UK 10 -1 2 9 18 2 3 14 
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
 
The analysis for the whole sample indicates that the credit markets channel (or gross 
savings) is the most important channel for consumption smoothing. The importance of this 
channel is however different across countries, being quite high and statistically significant 
at 1% with all estimation procedures for Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Greece 
(the particular ordering depends on the estimation method). For instance, no matter the 
estimation method, we can conclude that Finland smooths approximately half of GDP 
shocks, basically, through the credit markets channel.  
 
The remaining channels do not show too much capacity of consumption smoothing. A 
notable exception is Ireland, where the capital markets channel can smooth about 15% of 
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GDP shocks. As regards international transfers, we do not detect significant smoothing 
through this channel as the numbers that appear in the table are much smaller and hardly 
significant. Notice that there are two countries, France and UK, where we do not detect 
any significant smoothing effect through any of the channels by any estimation method. 
 
Table 2 shows the volatility (measured through the standard deviation) of idiosyncratic 
GDP. Leaving out the case of Ireland that we will explain later on, it turns out that, for 
instance, for the sample analysed, the volatility of idiosyncratic GDP in Greece is 8 times 
that of France, meaning that the shocks Greece has faced are 8 times bigger, on average, 
than those of more stable countries, like France, Belgium or the Netherlands, so not all the 
countries had the same needs for risk sharing.  
We repeat the analysis including Luxembourg in the set of countries. Table A1 in the Annex 
shows the results. Overall, Luxembourg has the highest shares of consumption smoothing, 
being close to full risk sharing. This is achieved through the capital and credit markets 
channels. 
 
Table 2. Standard deviation of idiosyncratic GDP, target group EU15 excluding LU. 
Sample: 1960-2016. 
Country Std Dev  
Ireland 0.053  
Greece 0.042  
Portugal 0.023  
Finland 0.016  
Spain 0.013  
Sweden 0.012  
UK 0.011  
Denmark 0.010  
Germany 0.007  
Italy 0.007  
Austria 0.007  
Netherlands 0.005  
Belgium 0.005  
France 0.005  
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
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4.2 Target group EU15: sub-sample analysis 
 
In order to get a flavour on how sharing risks has worked in recent times, we divide the 
sample in two periods 1960-1998 and 1999-2016. The values within each subsample 
should be taken as average figures for the years covered in each particular subsample. 
Notice that the second subsample is much shorter and, therefore, uncertainty around the 
estimations should be higher leading to less significant results. Table 3A shows the results 
for the first subsample (1960-1998) and Table 3B for the second one (1999-2016). In a 
similar way to the whole sample, the credit markets channel seems to be predominant to 
achieve consumption smoothing during the 1960-1998 period. The 3 methodologies used 
confirm that risk sharing through the credit markets channel was quite high in Belgium, 
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Sweden. This result is quite robust since no matter the 
estimation and/or model we used, the result is always statistically significant. There could 
be also some evidence that the capital markets channel was not working for some countries 
(Finland, Portugal, and Sweden). 
Table 3A. Percentage of risk sharing in case of shocks to domestic output. Analysis per 
country, target group EU15 excluding LU. Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing 
(% of domestic consumption smoothed). Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing 
obtained via capital markets, government and credit channels, respectively. Estimation 
sample: 1960-1998. 
1960-1998 SURE estimation VAR estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit Total Capital Gov Credit 
Austria 29 -3 2 29*** 3 -4 5** 2 
Belgium 86 1 -4 89*** 75 1 -3 77*** 
Denmark 10 -2 3 9 8 0 2 7 
Finland 51 -7*** 0 58*** 57 -5 0 62*** 
France 24 -1 -3 28 25 -4 0 29 
Germany 28 -1 1 28*** 20 -5 4** 20 
Greece 47 2 0 45*** 55 3 1 51*** 
Ireland 39 4 1 33*** 40 -2 -3 44*** 
Italy 42 5** -4*** 41*** 36 6 -2 32*** 
Netherlands 59 8 -1 52*** 50 12 2 36 
Portugal 14 -5** 4 15 28 -5 -6 39*** 
Spain 20 0 -1 21*** 20 -3 1 23** 
Sweden 57 -7*** 0 64*** 88 -7 0 95*** 
UK 13 -2 3 12 25 0 4 21 
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
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When we look at the second subsample (1999-2016), for the first time the capital markets 
channel appears statistically significant with all the procedures used to estimate the 
amount of risk sharing for a country, Ireland. The next section will describe in more detail 
the specific characteristics of the Irish economy. There is also strong evidence that the 
credit market channel was working for Finland and Ireland although, for the first time, 
there is evidence that this channel produced dis-smoothing in some countries (especially, 
Portugal and Italy), indicating their inability to put in place short-term measures to 
counteract the effects of the 2008 recession and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis. The 
credit channel has stopped to work also in Belgium and Sweden, compared to the first 
subsample. Recall that in Sweden the dot.com crisis was very severe and the credit channel 
(the usual way in this country to smooth consumption) was not able soften this shock. 
 
Table 3B. Percentage of risk sharing in case of shocks to domestic output. Analysis per 
country, target group EU15 excluding LU. Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing 
(% of domestic consumption smoothed). Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing 
obtained via capital markets, government and credit channels, respectively. Estimation 
sample: 1999-2016. 
1999-2016 SURE estimation VAR estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit Total Capital Gov Credit
Austria 8 4 -1 5 18 -7 -3 28 
Belgium 21 23 -4 2 16 14 -7 9 
Denmark 42 -16 -5 63*** -9 -10 2 -1 
Finland 73 13 -3 63** 47 1 -2 48*** 
France 23 14 4 4 6 -9 -2 16 
Germany 17 4 0 13 40 7 -1 33** 
Greece 9 7 2 1 24 6 -3 21 
Ireland 77 20** -1 58*** 85 37*** 1 46*** 
Italy 2 -1 4 -1 -18 4 0 -23** 
Netherlands 32 17 -1 16 37 18 -9 28 
Portugal 2 5 2 -6 -21 -3 17 -35** 
Spain 33 6 4 23 58 9 6 43 
Sweden 43 13 1 29 32 13 2*** 17 
UK 5 -3 -1 9 0 -6 3 3 
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
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We also repeated the subsample analysis including Luxembourg. Tables A2 and A3 in the 
Annex show the results. The conclusions for the first subsample (1960-2016) are the same 
as for the whole sample, being Luxembourg the country with the highest figures for risk 
sharing, specially, through the capital and credit markets. Curious enough, for the first 
time there is evidence of some risk sharing through the credit markets channel in the UK, 
although it totally disappears in the second subsample (see, Table A3). 
 
4.3 A closer look to Ireland 
 
Not only the credit market channel works quite well in Ireland, but also does the capital 
markets channel. Another fact that catches one’s eye is the high volatility of idiosyncratic 
GDP (10 times that of France, Belgium or the Netherlands). In fact, real GDP growth rate 
in Ireland for 2015 was over 26%! A closer look to Ireland shows two features.  
The first is due to the 2008 crisis. After 2008 Ireland experienced a huge housing bubble 
together with excessive credit expansion, the subsequent burst of this bubble generated 
loan losses for banks, a decline of aggregate demand, an increase in unemployment and a 
deterioration of public finances; as a consequence, the sovereign debt crisis came along 
and the Irish authorities requested assistance from the EU and IMF in November, 2010. 
The total financial assistance program amounted to €85 billion.  
 
In spite of the crisis and its effects Ireland has experienced a positive growth in the years 
before the Great Recession and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis. Figure 1 plots real 
GDP growth rate per capita computed employing the usual risk sharing deflator (CPI). With 
the exception of 2008 and 2009, per capita real GDP growth rates in Ireland were always 
positive, as Figure 1 shows. Average Irish real GDP growth rate (per capita) has been 7.6% 
for the sample 1960-2016. 
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Figure 1. Ireland’s real per capita GDP growth rates. Sample: 1960-2016. GDP deflator 
is CPI. 
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Note: data source AMECO. 
 
The Net Factor Income (NFI) in Ireland has been negative since 1976,8 indicating steady 
capital outflows. This is mainly due to the activities of foreign-owned multinational 
corporations and the repatriation of their profits from Ireland. Among EU15 (excluding 
Luxemburg) Ireland has the highest (negative) ratio of NFI to GDP. Due to low corporation 
tax rates, some large multinational enterprises have reallocated their headquarters to 
Ireland. As the Irish Central Statistical Office points out,9 especially in recent years, the 
net negative flows recorded in the balance of payments are mainly due to outflows of equity 
income (both, in direct investment income as well as in portfolio investment income, 
although the first one is more pronounced), that are much higher than their inflows 
counterparts. Other entries in the net factor income, as the compensation to employees 
and other net investment incomes are insignificant. This means that Ireland was actually 
smoothing positive GDP growth. This was mainly due to the repatriation of profits of foreign 
owned multinationals settled in Ireland. 
 
 
 
                                           
8 This means that the Gross National Income (GNI) has been lower than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during 
all those years. 
9  http://cso.ie/en/media/csoie/methods/balanceofinternationalpayments/trendsnetfactorincome.pdf 
21 
Figure 2. Irish ratio NFI/GDP (in percentage). Sample: 1960-2016 
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Note: data source AMECO. 
 
The second peculiar feature of Ireland is a real GDP growth rate for 2015 at 26% with a 
negative net factor income close to 21% of GDP. As pointed out by the OECD,10 some large 
multinationals have recently domiciled their headquarters in Ireland moving there their 
intangible assets (intellectual property rights) because of Irish low corporate tax regime. 
This implies that the sales associated to these assets are accounted for in the Irish GDP, 
pushing up the value of the state’s balance sheet. In 2016, GDP growth rate in Ireland 
went down to around 5%, more in line with average historical Irish growth rates. We 
included the latest available data up to 2016 in our estimations. 
 
4.4 Target group: EU28 
 
Due to data availability, the sample used for the estimation of EU28 covers the period 
1995-2016. We perform the analysis excluding Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, and 
Slovenia: Croatia recently joined the EU, Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia are very small and 
Luxembourg displays a volatile behaviour that could condition estimations. Including those 
countries, however, does not change the findings (see Annex 1 for the results). Table 4 
reports the results. Due to the turbulent times included in the sample, we find cases of 
positive and negative short term smoothing through any of the channels. The conclusions 
for the countries in the EU15 group practically remain unaltered when a larger group is 
                                           
10 https://www.oecd.org/std/na/Irish-GDP-up-in-2015-OECD.pdf 
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considered, being Ireland and Finland those with the higher percentage of domestic 
consumption smoothing. 
Cross-border risk sharing via capital markets works quite well for Ireland and the Baltic 
countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). It is worth noting the case of Latvia where 
risk sharing achieved through the capital markets channel (the highest among all the 
countries in the sample) is offset by dis-smoothing through the credit channel. Figures A1 
and A2 offer an intuitive graphical explanation. In Figure A1, idiosyncratic GDP and 
consumption growth rates go hand in hand indicating the total absence of smoothing, while 
in Figure A2 idiosyncratic GDP is compared with the three channels, showing that the 
capital markets channel acts as shock absorber. Instead, the credit or savings channel acts 
counter-cyclically to GDP, offsetting the smoothing achieved through the capital markets 
channel. A closer look to the Baltic countries reveals that there was a strong presence of 
foreign banks (mainly Nordic) in all 3 countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), although 
in Latvia domestic banks also have a considerable presence. After the bust in construction, 
activity fell from 10 to 4% of GDP and housing prices collapsed. In fact, GDP growth rates 
fell more than 14% in the 3 Baltic countries in 2009. However, the foreign banks absorbed 
most of the shocks and the three countries were growing at 6% or more by 2011. The only 
country that needed international financial assistance was Latvia,11 which has a larger 
share of domestic banks. The bailout in Latvia imposed austerity measures to the national 
government that jointly with the high unemployment rate (around 20% during the crisis) 
turn out in a severe dis-smoothing behavior in consumption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
11https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-
assistance/which-eu-countries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistance-latvia_en 
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Table 4. Percentage of risk sharing to shocks to domestic output. Target group EU28 
excluding LU, CY, MT, HR and SI. Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing (% of 
domestic consumption smoothed). Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing obtained 
via capital markets, government and credit channels, respectively. Sample: 1995-2016. 
1995-2016 SURE estimation VAR estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov. Credit Total Capital Gov. Credit 
Austria 8 9 2 -3 21 0 1 20 
Belgium 13 16 -4 0 5 -3 -2 10 
Bulgaria 41 -13 4 49 49 25** 9 15** 
Czech Republic 35 1 5*** 30 8 16 3 -11 
Denmark 40 -3 -5 48** 13 -5 -7* 25 
Estonia 17 13** 2 2 28 13** 2 13 
Finland 55 3 0 53*** 59 8 -3** 54*** 
France 24 11 2 11 2 15 -3 -9 
Germany 8 12 0 -4 38 -2 0 40 
Greece 12 6 2 3 19 0 0 19* 
Hungary -4 10 0 -14 9 1 0 8 
Ireland 67 17** 0 50*** 73 38*** 1 34** 
Italy -1 -9 3 5 -16 -2 1 -15 
Latvia 6 16*** 4 -14 -2 25*** 4 -31*** 
Lithuania 18 16*** -1 3 21 20*** -1 2 
Netherlands 18 13 0 5 27 18 -2 11 
Poland 29 9 1 19 38 10 8 20 
Portugal 10 8 2 1 10 18** 3 -10 
Romania 13 -2 2 12 17 -1 2 16 
Slovakia 19 -3 3 19 33 -1 7** 27*** 
Spain 29 5 3 22 58 4 2 52** 
Sweden 18 10 2 5 11 12 4 -4 
UK 12 -10 0 22 12 1 0 11 
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations. The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
 
We repeat the analysis including all the countries within the EU28. Due to data availability, 
the sample covers the time span 1995-2016. Table A4 in the Annex shows the results that 
remain unaltered although placing also Luxembourg and Malta among the first places in 
risk sharing, as expected (being them international financial hubs). 
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5 Relative performance of countries  
 
The static estimation of the first two models allows decomposing the effect of risk sharing 
for each country in two parts: a common and an idiosyncratic one. During crisis period 
nearly all countries have displayed some smoothing through the analysed channels. 
However, to better understand the differences across countries we look at each country’s 
performance on top of the average (common) performance for each of the channels. This 
is the idiosyncratic effect. For this purpose, we re-write the basic equations for estimating 
risk sharing (1) to (3) as: 
  
Δlog(GDP) − 	Δlog(GNI) = ߚ଴,௄ + (ߚ௄,ெீ + ߚ௄,௜)	Δlog(GDP) + ݑ௄   (1’) 
Δlog(GNI) − 	Δlog(GDI) = ߚ଴,ி + (ߚி,ெீ + ߚி,௜)	Δlog(GDP) + ݑி   (2’) 
Δlog(GDI) − 	Δlog(C) = ߚ଴,஼ + (ߚ஼,ெீ + ߚ஼,௜)	Δlog(GDP) + ݑ஼   (3’) 
 
where we have decomposed the parameter that represents risk sharing through each 
channel as the sum of two parts, a common or average, and an idiosyncratic one. To 
estimate the common part of risk sharing through each channel, ߚ௄,ெீ for the capital 
markets, ߚி,ெீ for the fiscal or government channel and ߚ஼,ெீ	for the credit market channel, 
we use the Mean Group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995), averaging the country 
estimates for each channel. For each channel and each country, the idiosyncratic part is 
given by the amount of risk sharing estimated on top of the common or average part. 
Table 5 gives the results for the target group EU15 excluding Luxembourg for the full 
sample (1960-2016). 
 
The bottom line (MG estimator) represents the average or common risk sharing for the 
group of countries considered, while for each country we report the idiosyncratic behaviour 
i.e. the share of additional consumption smoothing through each one of the channels. If 
the previous sections gave a picture of risk sharing in absolute terms for each country, 
Table 5 focuses on the relative performance of the countries giving a comparative analysis. 
As expected, allowing for heterogeneity results in different average estimates of risk 
sharing than considering all the countries as homogeneous and estimating a unique model 
for all of them as usually reported in the literature. Notice, as well, the case of UK (followed 
by Portugal) pointing out that risk sharing was way behind average figures for the whole 
set of years, especially through the credit market channel.  
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Table 5. Percentage of common and idiosyncratic risk sharing to shocks to domestic 
output. Target group EU15 excluding LU. Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing 
obtained via capital markets, government and credit channels, respectively. Sample: 1995-
2016. 
 
 1961-2016 SURE estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit
Austria -9 -2 2 -9 
Belgium 34 6 -4 32 
Denmark -20 -6 2 -16 
Finland 18 -7 0 25 
France -10 2 -1 -11 
Germany -9 -1 1 -8 
Greece -2 2 1 -6 
Ireland 29 13 0 16 
Italy -3 3 -2 -5 
Netherlands 20 9 -1 13 
Portugal -21 -5 4 -21 
Spain -11 1 1 -12 
Sweden 13 -7 0 20 
UK -24 -2 2 -24 
MG estimator 34 1 0 33
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
 
Table 6 gives the results for the set of EU28 for the sample 1995-2016, excluding the very 
small and volatile economies. Focusing now on the capital markets channel, it is worth 
mentioning the poor behaviour of this channel in Bulgaria and Italy. However, while in 
Bulgaria the credit markets channel compensates the dis-smoothing that took place 
through the capital markets channel, in Italy the credit channel was additional to the capital 
channel in the collapse of risk sharing in this country in last 20 years.  
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Table 6. Percentage of common and idiosyncratic risk sharing to shocks to domestic 
output. Target group EU28 excluding LU, CY, MT, HR and SI. Capital, Gov and Credit refer 
to risk sharing obtained via capital markets, government and credit channels, respectively. 
Sample: 1995-2016. 
 
1995-2016 SURE estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit
Austria -13 3 1 -17
Belgium -8 10 -5 -14
Bulgaria 20 -19 3 35
Czech Republic 14 -5 4 16
Denmark 19 -9 -6 34
Estonia -4 7 1 -12
Finland 34 -3 -1 39
France 3 5 1 -3
Germany -13 6 -1 -18
Greece -9 0 1 -11
Hungary -25 4 -1 -28
Ireland 46 11 -1 36
Italy -22 -15 2 -9
Latvia -15 10 3 -28
Lithuania -3 10 -2 -11
Netherlands -3 7 -1 -9
Poland 8 3 0 5
Portugal -11 2 1 -13
Romania -8 -8 1 -2
Slovakia -2 -9 2 5
Spain 8 -1 2 8
Sweden -3 4 1 -9
United Kingdom -9 -16 -1 8
MG estimator 21 6 1 14
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
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6 Conclusions 
 
We characterize risk sharing (i.e. consumption smoothing) across the EU28 countries and 
derive estimates of risk sharing for each channel – credit, capital and government channels. 
To check the robustness of our results, we provide estimations using several models 
(considering the channels individually, as a system taking into account possible interactions 
among them, and as a dynamic system to add time-dependent effects). 
 
Following the literature we define GDP shocks as deviations from the cross-country average 
GDP growth rates of a set of target countries. The first target group is composed by 15 EU 
countries for which data availability is the largest (overall 1960-2016). This enables 
supplementary analysis on the effects of the financial and the sovereign crisis on risk 
sharing by splitting the sample size in two periods. In our sample not all countries had the 
same needs for risk sharing as the size of the idiosyncratic shocks is country-dependent. 
For instance, the volatility of idiosyncratic GDP for Ireland and Greece is 10 and 8 times 
higher than that of more stable countries, like France, Belgium or the Netherlands.  
 
Looking at the set of countries in the EU15 group, results show that the credit markets 
channel is the first source of consumption smoothing. However, the consumption 
smoothing ability of this channel depends on the sample analysed. In most recent times, 
shaped by the turbulences of the 2008 and the sovereign crisis, this channel became less 
important and occasionally, for certain countries (notably, Italy and Portugal), even 
displayed negative values, indicating a certain degree of dis-smoothing (in other terms the 
credit channel was not able to absorb GDP shocks). Notice that this channel acts, not only 
through cross border lending and borrowing, but it also has a national connotation, as it 
reflects the decreased investments due to the shock. Although some countries appear as 
having higher shares of consumption smoothing through this channel in the sample 1960-
1998 (i.e., Belgium and Sweden), analysing all samples, overall Ireland and Finland 
appear achieving the greatest shares of risk sharing through the credit markets channel. 
 
The capital markets channel, languishing in the older sample, becomes much more 
active in the post Euro sample, especially in Ireland where huge outflows in the net factor 
income (mainly in the form of income on equities) have worked to smooth positive GDP 
shocks in later times due to the repatriation of profits earned by multinationals settled in 
Ireland, and attracted by low corporation tax rates.  
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The government channel (risk sharing achieved through public international transfers) 
shows to be practically inexistent for all target groups and sample sizes. 
Looking at the whole set of EU countries, though with a smaller sample size (1995-2016), 
results hardly change with respect to the EU15 countries. Surprisingly, the capital 
markets channel as a source of risk sharing seems working efficiently in the Baltic 
countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). This is due to strong presence of foreign 
banks that acted as shock absorbers avoiding the collapse of the banking system during 
the breakdown of the housing market. However, while in Lithuania and Estonia the banking 
systems had a predominant presence of Finnish and Swedish banks, Latvia had a 
substantial share of national banks that were nationalized following the international 
bailout (Latvia was the only Baltic country to be intervened). During this period the savings 
channel in Latvia acted counter cyclically offsetting the benefits from the capital markets 
channel. Luxembourg and Malta also emerge as achieving high percentages of risk sharing, 
especially through the capital and credit markets channels. As an exception, Luxembourg 
seems to experience a considerable quota of dis-smoothing through the government 
channel when we consider all the countries (the time span, in this case, is 1995-2016). 
Our analysis suggests that different countries have difference needs in terms of risk 
sharing. Furthermore, channels work differently in each country depending on the size and 
openness of the countries. This might have implications for one-size-fits-all type of policies 
fostering risk sharing. 
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Annex: additional tables and figures 
 
Analysis for EU15, including Luxembourg 
 
Table A1. Percentage of risk sharing in case of shocks to domestic output. Analysis per 
country, target group EU15. Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing (% of 
domestic consumption smoothed). Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing obtained 
via capital markets, government and credit channels, respectively. Sample: 1960-2016. 
 
EU15 1960-2016 Uniequational estimation SURE estimation VAR estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit Total Capital Gov Credit Total Capital Gov Credit 
Austria 26 -2 3 24 25 -1 2 24** 3 -3 1 4 
Belgium 63 6 -1 58*** 68 7 -4* 65*** 45 0 -3 49*** 
Denmark 16 -2 1 18 14 -5 2 17** 13 -2 1 14 
Finland 49 -6 0 55*** 52 -6*** 0 58*** 43 -1 0 44*** 
France 30 5 1 23 24 3 -1 22 9 1 2 6 
Germany 28 2 0 27** 25 0 0 25*** 23 -1 2 22** 
Greece 34 2 1 30*** 32 3 1 27*** 42 0 -2 44*** 
Ireland 65 14*** 0 51*** 64 14*** 0 49*** 79 17*** 3 60*** 
Italy 28 7 -2 23 31 4 -2 28*** 25 5 -1 21** 
Luxembourg 91 21*** -4 74*** 92 19 -4 78*** 100 39** -16 76*** 
Netherlands 54 10 0 44*** 54 10 -1 45*** 31 -1 1 31 
Portugal 10 -4 3 11 13 -4 4 13 15 -3 -1 19 
Spain 24 1 0 22** 23 2 1 21*** 27 3 3 21** 
Sweden 47 -8 0 55*** 47 -6 0 53*** 63 -9 0 72*** 
United Kingdom 6 -1 4 4 10 -1 2 9 19 2 3 14 
 
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
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Table A2. Percentage of risk sharing in case of shocks to domestic output. Analysis per 
country, target group EU15. Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing (% of 
domestic consumption smoothed). Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing obtained 
via capital markets, government and credit channels, respectively. Sample: 1961-1998. 
 Uniequational estimation SURE estimation VAR estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit Total Capital Gov     Credit Total Capital Gov Credit 
Austria 28 -1 2 27 29 -3 2 29*** -1 -4 2 2 
Belgium 74 3 -2 73*** 85 1 -4 89*** 84 1 -1 85*** 
Denmark 13 -3 2 14 10 -2 3 9 9 0 1 8 
Finland 48 -8** 1 56*** 51 -7*** 0 58*** 47 -5 1 51*** 
France 30 4 -1 27 24 -1 -3 27* 21 -2 2 21 
Germany 34 0 1 33** 27 -1 1 28*** 18 -3 2 18 
Greece 49 1 0 48*** 47 2 0 45*** 59 5 0 53*** 
Ireland 43 5 0 38*** 39 4 1 33*** 47 -10 5 52*** 
Italy 33 6 -2 29 42 5** -4** 41*** 38 8*** -2 32*** 
Luxembourg 91 10*** 0 81*** 92 10 0 83*** 116 -2 1 117*** 
Netherlands 58 8 0 50*** 59 8 -1 52*** 38 10 3 26 
Portugal 10 -5 3 13 14 -5** 4 15 20 -6 -2 28 
Spain 20 1 -1 20 20 0 -1 21*** 21 -1 -2 24** 
Sweden 53 -8 0 61*** 57 -7*** 0 64*** 78 -7** 0 85*** 
UK 6 -3 4 5 13 -2 3 12 26 1 5 20** 
 
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
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Table A3. Percentage of risk sharing in case of shocks to domestic output. Analysis per 
country, target group EU15. Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing (% of 
domestic consumption smoothed). Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing obtained 
via capital markets, government and credit channels, respectively. Sample: 1999-2016. 
 
EU15 1999-2016 Uniequational estimation SURE estimation VAR estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit Total Capital Gov Credit Total Capital Gov Credit 
Austria 16 -5 8 13 8 4 -1 5 12 -6 -1 19 
Belgium 25 13 5 6 21 23 -4 2 -2 -4 -2 4 
Denmark 43 3 -10 50* 42 -16 -5 63*** 19 -7 3 22 
Finland 54 24 -15 45 72 13 -4** 63** 53 7 -3** 49*** 
France 32 10 10 13 23 14 4 4 2 -11 0 13 
Germany 20 7 -3 16 17 4 0 13 42 6 0 37** 
Greece 10 3 3 4 9 7 2 1 16 -2 -4** 22** 
Ireland 76 19*** 0 57*** 77 20** 0 58*** 79 26*** 0 53*** 
Italy 0 0 -1 1 3 0 4 -1 -8 4 0 -13 
Luxembourg 92 84*** -27** 36*** 90 65 -24 49* 105 49 -7 64** 
Netherlands 35 21 -3 17 32 17 -1 16 16 30 -3 -10 
Portugal 0 3 1 -3 2 5 2 -5 5 14 6 -15 
Spain 31 0 5 26 33 6 4 24 41 2 4 35 
Sweden 26 2 -3 26 43 13 1 29 29 -4 0 33** 
United Kingdom 5 8 2 -5 5 -3 -1 9 1 0 1 1 
 
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
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Table A4. Percentage of risk sharing in case of shocks to domestic output. Analysis per 
country, target group EU28. Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing (% of 
domestic consumption smoothed). Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing obtained 
via capital markets, government and credit channels, respectively. Sample: 1996-2016. 
 
EU28 1995-2016 Uniequational estimation SURE estimation VAR estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit Total Capital Gov Credit Total Capital Gov Credit 
Austria 12 13 4 -5 8 9 2 -3 3 -2 -1 7
Belgium 22 4 0 19 13 16 -4 0 4 1 -1 4
Bulgaria 42 -15** 4 53*** 41 -13 4 49 38 17 8 13
Croatia 26 3 3 20 18 -1 3 16 6 -1 -5 12
Cyprus 6 -31 -4 41 -1 -28 -2 29 -2 22 3 -26
Czech Republic 28 8 2 18 35 1 5*** 30 46 -3 -1 49**
Denmark 40 7 -7 40 40 -3 -5 48** 12 -3 -2 17
Estonia 16 8 1 7 17 13 2 2 32 18*** 1 13
Finland 51 2 -2 51** 56 3 0 53*** 58 10** -3** 51***
France 31 16 3 12 24 12 2 10 -3 0 1 -4
Germany 11 16 -1 -3 8 12 0 -4 40 4 0 37
Greece 13 5 3 6 12 6 2 3 17 -1 -4** 22**
Hungary 9 9 1 -2 -4 10 0 -14 6 -13 -6 25
Ireland 67 16*** 0 51*** 67 17** 0 50*** 80 27*** 0 53***
Italy 0 -2 0 2 -1 -9 3 5 -14 3 2 -20
Latvia 9 12** 3 -5 6 16*** 4 -14 3 42*** 6 -46**
Lithuania 18 13** -2 7 18 16*** -1 3 31 24*** -2 8
Luxembourg 87 69*** -23*** 41** 81 58 -22 45 82 64 -28 46**
Malta 67 18 -6 55*** 73 13 -3 63** 92 28 -6 69
Netherlands 25 19 -1 7 18 13 0 5 14 9 -3 8
Poland 20 7 1 13 29 9 1 19 47 21 10 15
Portugal 12 10 1 1 10 8 2 1 8 16** 5 -13
Romania 11 1 1 9 13 -2 2 12 6 5 1 0
Slovakia 17 4 1 11 20 -3 3 19 37 -11 11 37**
Slovenia 42 9 -2 35 35 4 0 31 46 12 -3 37**
Spain 32 3 3 27 29 4 3 22 39 3 3 33
Sweden 23 -3 1 26 18 11 2 5 29 -8 -2 39**
UK 7 -2 0 9 12 -10 0 22 8 5 0 3
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
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Table A5. Percentage of risk sharing in case of shocks to domestic output. Benchmark 
analysis: uniequational estimation. Analysis per country, target group EU15 excluding LU. 
Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing (% of domestic consumption smoothed). 
Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing obtained via capital markets, government and 
credit channels, respectively. Sample: 1960-2016. 
 
 1960-2016 Uniequational estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit 
Austria 24 -2 2 23
Belgium 61 5 -3 58***
Denmark 17 -3 1 18
Finland 49 -6** 0 56***
France 29 1 1 28
Germany 27 1 1 25**
Greece 34 3 0 31***
Ireland 65 15*** 0 50***
Italy 27 2 -1 26
Netherlands 54 10 0 44***
Portugal 9 -4 3** 10
Spain 24 2 0 22**
Sweden 46 -6 0 53***
UK 5 0 3 3
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
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Table A6. Percentage of risk sharing in case of shocks to domestic output. Benchmark 
analysis: uniequational estimation. Analysis per country, target group EU15 excluding LU. 
Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing (% of domestic consumption smoothed). 
Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing obtained via capital markets, government and 
credit channels, respectively. Estimation sample: 1960-1998. 
 
1960-1998 Uniequational estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit 
Austria 26 -2 3 25 
Belgium 72 2 -2 71*** 
Denmark 13 -2 2 13 
Finland 48 -7*** 0 56*** 
France 31 -1 -1 33 
Germany 31 0 1 30** 
Greece 50 1 0 49*** 
Ireland 43 7*** 1 36*** 
Italy 32 4 -1 29** 
Netherlands 57 8 1 49*** 
Portugal 10 -5** 3** 11 
Spain 20 1 -1 20 
Sweden 52 -8** 0 60*** 
UK 4 -2 3 3 
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
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Table A7. Percentage of risk sharing in case of shocks to domestic output. Benchmark 
analysis: uniequational estimation. Analysis per country, target group EU15 excluding LU. 
Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing (% of domestic consumption smoothed). 
Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing obtained via capital markets, government and 
credit channels, respectively. Estimation sample: 1999-2016. 
 
1999-2016 Uniequational estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit
Austria 13 0 -1 14
Belgium 21 15 -5 10
Denmark 45 -9 -4 58**
Finland 56 8 -3 51**
France 27 7 5 15
Germany 20 3 1 16
Greece 10 6 1 3
Ireland 76 20*** 0 57***
Italy 1 -5 2 4
Netherlands 38 18 -1 21
Portugal 1 3 2 -4
Spain 32 5 3 24
Sweden 27 1 -1 27
UK 4 10 -1 -4
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
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Table A8. Percentage of risk sharing to shocks to domestic output. Benchmark analysis: 
uniequational estimation. Analysis per country, target group EU28 excluding LU, CY, MT, 
HR and SI. Total refers to the percentage of total risk sharing (% of domestic consumption 
smoothed). Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing obtained via capital markets, 
government and credit channels, respectively. Sample: 1995-2016. 
 
 
1995-2016 Uniequational estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov. Credit 
Austria 3 14 2 -14
Belgium 14 10 -1 5
Bulgaria 42 -16*** 4*** 54***
Czech Republic 29 12 3 15
Denmark 35 4 -5 35
Estonia 16 9** 2 5
Finland 47 0 1 47**
France 20 14 5 1
Germany 4 7 1 -4
Greece 14 7 2 5
Hungary 9 9 1 -1
Ireland 67 17*** 0 50***
Italy -5 -4 2*** -3
Latvia 9 12*** 3 -6
Lithuania 18 12*** -1 6
Netherlands 20 18 0 2
Poland 18 8 0 10
Portugal 10 11 3 -3
Romania 12 1 1 11
Slovakia 16 1 3 12
Spain 32 7 3 22
Sweden 21 -2 2 20
UK 5 3 0 2
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
The symbols ** and *** indicate significant at 5 and 1% level. 
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Table A9. Percentage of common and idiosyncratic risk sharing to shocks to domestic 
output. Benchmark analysis: uniequational estimation. Target group EU15 excluding LU. 
Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing obtained via capital markets, government and 
credit channels, respectively. Sample: 1995-2016. 
 
 1961-2016 Uniequational estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit
Austria -10 -3 1 -9 
Belgium 27 4 -4 26 
Denmark -17 -4 0 -14 
Finland 15 -7 -1 24 
France -5 0 0 -4 
Germany -7 0 0 -7 
Greece 0 2 -1 -1 
Ireland 31 14 -1 18 
Italy -7 1 -2 -6 
Netherlands 20 9 -1 12 
Portugal -25 -5 2 -22 
Spain -10 1 -1 -10 
Sweden 12 -7 -1 21 
UK -29 -1 2 -29 
MG estimator 34 1 1 32
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Table A10. Percentage of common and idiosyncratic risk sharing to shocks to domestic 
output. Benchmark analysis: uniequational estimation. Target group EU28 excluding 
excluding LU, CY, MT, HR and SI. Capital, Gov and Credit refer to risk sharing obtained via 
capital markets, government and credit channels, respectively. Sample: 1995-2016. 
 
1995-2016 Uniequational estimation 
Country Total Capital Gov Credit 
Austria -17 7 1 -26
Belgium -6 3 -2 -7
Bulgaria 22 -23 3 42
Czech Republic 9 5 2 3
Denmark 15 -3 -6 23
Estonia -4 2 1 -7
Finland 27 -7 0 35
France 0 7 4 -11
Germany -16 0 0 -16
Greece -6 0 1 -7
Hungary -11 2 0 -13
Ireland 47 10 -1 38
Italy -25 -11 1 -15
Latvia -11 5 2 -18
Lithuania -2 5 -2 -6
Netherlands 0 11 -1 -10
Poland -2 1 -1 -2
Portugal -10 4 2 -15
Romania -8 -6 0 -1
Slovakia -4 -6 2 0
Spain 12 0 2 10
Sweden 1 -9 1 8
United Kingdom -15 -4 -1 -10
MG estimator 20 7 1 12
Note: data source AMECO, JRC estimations.  
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Latvia 
Figure A1. Idiosyncratic GDP and consumption growth rates in Latvia. Sample 1995-
2016. 
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Figure A2. Idiosyncratic GDP growth rates and the 3 channels (capital markets, 
government and credit markets channel) in Latvia. Sample 1995-2016. 
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